2013/1, стр. 67 - 79

IBN SINA – GREAT ISLAMIC THINKER

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IbnSina wrote works on medicine, philosophy, and linguistics, works of art, the state certificates and verses. He divided the philosophy on theoretical and practical, and the policy considered as top of practical philosophy. IbnSina have defined his sight at a subject and appointment of philosophy which, in his opinion, includes all human wisdom – „hikmat“. He considered the philosophy as a complex science which is divided into theoretical and practical branches. As theoretical knowledge the philosophy has the appointment-true knowledge; as practical - it is directed on blessing achievement. The preliminary condition of comprehension of philosophy is a logic mastering without which the correct and demonstrative knowledge is impossible. The theoretical and practical philosophy at IbnSina is dismembered on number of the disciplines differing from degree of a subject of knowledge and on a functional purpose. It divides theoretical philosophy into a science about concrete material things, or to the physicist; a science about abstract quantitative relations, or to the mathematics (it includes mechanics, astronomy and music), and a science about the higher universal abstraction, or metaphysics. It divides practical philosophy into sciences about the blessing persons (ethics), about the blessing families (economy) and about the blessing of the state (politician). In the structure of theoretical sciences which it called the generalising term „philosophy“, IbnSina has included, thus, natural sciences (physicist), „average“, or a mathematical science (actually the mathematics, astronomy and music) and, at last, „first“, or the „higher“ science studying absolute life (metaphysics). The majority of theoretical sciences IbnSina has subdivided into pure and applied disciplines. So, for example, to the pure physic she has carried doctrines about the matter, the form, movement, minerals, plants, animal, and to the applied physics - medicine, astronomy, an explanation of dreams, alchemy and „science“ about magic. As we see, in this classification of sciences IbnSina studied again all knowledge which has been saved up by mankind, to demarcate for the convenience of the review of knowledge theoretical and practical, pure science and applied. Classification of sciences according IbnSina has basically objective character and leans against distinction of objects of research in different sciences. Giving tribute to the time, IbnSina has enlisted on department of sciences also an astrology, an explanation of dreams, alchemy, „science“ about magic and as we already wrote above, chiromancy, in which itself was the great expert. Classification of sciences according to IbnSina sometimes can create illusion, that private sciences for it served as only separate scopes of principles, is directly or indirectly deduced of metaphysics as „sciences of sciences“ as he characterises subjects of these sciences as intrinsic subject of the first philosophy. Moreover, the position occupied in the first philosophy is „a divine science“ – theology in the true sense words. And the philosophy then appears „the servant of divinity“. We take, for example, „The healing book“, almost entirely devoted to the nature, and to the exact sciences; the metaphysics in it occupies insignificant place, and „divine science“ – and at all insignificant. The philosophy, of course, had for IbnSina an independent value, but first of all it was necessary for him as the higher substantiation of reliability of knowledge of the surrounding nature, found by the scientist. A.V. Sagadeev writes for IbnSina, as he was a famous researcher of scientific and philosophical heritage: „not ceasing to be the higher synthesis and generalisation of knowledge in concrete areas, the philosophy during epoch IbnSina carried out a difficult and responsible role. Which was not peculiar to it during an antiquity epoch, protected opodiction knowledge from the dominating ideology based on rhetoric and dialectics, i.e. From claims on exclusive possession true from (orthodox) religion and speculative divinity“2). As the central, main problem of philosophy IbnSina considered the person, his essence and existence, the life, physical and spiritual development. Almost all main products of the thinker are devoted to all-round in-depth study of physical and spiritual human life and serve as a management of healing, rescue and physical, spiritual, perfection of a human life and the person. As in any considerable, solid philosophical system, in philosophical doctrine of the thinker the central concept is the category „vudjud“ („life“). Life is a uniform, it consists necessary-real, or essence, and is possible-real, or existence. Proceeding from tradition of ancient eastern wisdom and philosophy, in particular the great predecessor and compatriot Zoroastra and other thinkers, IbnSina considered, that the beginning, the basis of everyone’s existing is necessary - real which is eternal and it is not subject to change.

Let’s consider philosophical doctrine of IbnSina about the life, stated by it in „the Treatise about essence and quality of life“, „the Treatise about division (classification) of existing things“ and, at last, in the major philosophical product — „the knowledge Book“ („Danish-name“). Philosophy subject, on IbnSina`s life as that is the philosophy investigates at first life itself, then that division of life follows from it on uniform and much, on the general and private, on possible and necessary, on substance and accidentional. Under IbnSina`s doctrine, the world’s life is difficult and its existence it is necessary. The In itself world is something possible which as that can exist or not exist. If it exists, it is necessary to assume the reason which has given life to this possible. Owing to this reason possibility passes in the validity. Thanks to the necessary reason a thing to exist actually this is the necessary reason of all existing, which IbnSina names God. IbnSina designates the God a word „Hak“. But the word „Hak“ has also other value: it is „reality“, or „an absolute reality“. In other products, mainly philosophical, it designates the God the words „vodzhib-is scarlet - vudzhud“, i.e. it is necessary-real. It is necessary-real, unlike generated by it „imkon-is scarlet-vudzhud“, i.e. it is possible-real, absolutely, common.

The spirit, as the separate essence, cannot be the reincarnating subject for its separateness is seemed and shown only until exists shrouding it and the hiding material cover which has created illusion of individuality. Spiritual progress is, according to IbnSina and its followers, including representatives tасаwwuf, the gradual combination which this material covers while at last with its visibility of the individual will not leave anything. Then the spirit will be perceived by that what it is and always was, - the Unique reality where „all and anything“ meet and appears the same. In theology language is necessary-real - the God, or Pure Light. In some products IbnSina is necessary-real named „Soul of the world“, and is possible-real - its body. Therefore statements of numerous authors of books and articles about philosophical outlook of IbnSina, are that he was the dualist who has recognized dual is eternal. The opposite has begun the world, spiritual and material, it is necessary to be considered as insolvent, superficial, unilateral approaches to his doctrine. IbnSina himself, against such charges, was accurately and clearly objected, and his doctrine is reflected on the uniform beginning, and its system – „tauhid“.

Characterizing the basis of the philosophical outlook in the form accessible to the wide reader, the thinker wrote: True (God) – world spirit, and all the world -his body, sort of spiritual beings - feeling of this body, heavenly beings, the elements born – parts. This is what the doctrine about the uniform consists. And the rest - an empty reasoning.

Everything, that the body possesses and the form it represents is possiblereal. In other words, the possible-real is that lies to exist and can not exist. Such are the material bodies possessing the certain form; for them existence or not existence are equal. If their essence gets life they exist, if it is not present they do not exist. If the essence is inseparable from existence, and its existence follows from essence something, instead of its existence, it is impossible and in that case leads to the contradiction. Such life is called necessary-real in its necessary-real existence and essence coincides with its essence its existence follows. In it the essence and existence coincide, for its essence and existence are identical. Only its life consists in him, and it exists in itself, irrespective of something. For all the others existence as akaccidentional joins their essence. So, speaks IbnSina, all existing on the world, possessing the certain form, is possible-real. The necessary-real attaches to it the light and awards the existence status. Hence, this world and everything, that is in it, represents is possible-real and requires in is necessary-real. Besides, the possible-real is shared on two forms. First, is identical-possible; second, what can exist only as possible and which cannot find the status obligatory, necessary spiritual beings both purely reasonable abstraction and angels concern the first category, which are „eternal creations“ the God. These beings thanks to God became obligatory and necessary. All creations of this world in which quality of existence and disappearance are subject to disappearance is inherent concern the second phase and are born once only to die. Besides, IbnSina`s leaning is against the ideas of some predecessors, in particular, the ideas of east wise men, and also Socrat, Platon and Aristotle.

If some philosophical sights of IbnSina are continuation and the further development of its great predecessors, that he openly recognised, it is impossible to hide it, opposing them or to deform their true party for the sake of protection of dominating ideology. Here Platon, whom our thinkers named „Divine Platon“, wrote on a case: „It is represented tome, - Platon wrote, - that to begin should differentiate here the two things: what there is eternally arising, but never real. That is comprehended by means of refl ection and an explanation, obviously, and it is eternally identical life; and that arises and perishes, but never exists actually. However all arising should have any reason for the existence, for to arise without the reason is absolutely impossible. If the demiurge (creator) of any thing looks on invariably real and its beret in quality at creation of idea and a potentiality of the given thing, everything necessary is fi ne. And what about the universal sky? Whether we name its space or other name which will appear for it, the most suitable, we anyway are obliged to bring concerning its attention to the question, with which should begin consideration of any thing: whether it was there always, not having the beginning of the occurrence, or it has arisen, leaving from there. The beginnings? It has arisen: after all, it is perceived, corporally, and all which is notable and, being perceived as a result of sensation opinion, arises and is generated. But we say, that all arising requires for the occurrence a certain reason“3).Apparently, the reasonings of IbnSina on the world and its occurrence are in many respects identical to judgements of his great predecessor Platon. However the division of IbnSina of life is into three forms: on its necessary-real, its possible-real and impossible, it is original it is original and represents the further development of doctrines of its predecessors (both east, and western). In this respect even classics –coryphae uses of the West European medieval philosophy - such as Albert Veliky, Toma Akvinsky and others, were philosophers – scholastics were adherents of these philosophical ideas of the great thinker. Moreover, later the most outstanding philosophers directions, for example, Benedikt Spinosa and its followers, consciously or unconsciously; became successors and continuers of doctrine of IbnSina about essence and existence. Even the most visible philosophers of the XX-th century (for example, many representatives of philosophy existensionalizm) recognise as the main basis of the world or, according to Fromm, an is necessary- real – universum - shown in set of beings of it the world, as above, the God, according to IbnSina, not that already was specified, as necessary life, an original cause of all existing. It takes the highest place in hierarchy of life. In the God its essence is necessary, it coincides with its existence and, on the contrary, the essence of each separate thing has in itself no basis for own existence. In relation to essence of each thing its existence is something casual. As we see, the reasonings of IbnSina test Aristotle’s influence. But business is not settled by infl uence stagirit. The God, according to IbnSina, does not act in a role as it is confi rmed by Aristotle: it is an original cause of all existing and matters life.

In the philosophy of IbnSina, the question on essence and existence is directly connected with a question on a substance, about a matter and the form. According to IbnSina, the substance - as basis of life is not in any subject unlike the substance, which depends on the subject, the carrier. What is the nature of this carrier or, otherwise, what consists a final basis of life of all individual phenomena? There are already obvious essential differences of the ideas of IbnSina from the straight views. As, under doctrine of IbnSina, the world does not exist by own necessity, means, its validity is preceded by possibility. But the possibility anticipating the validity, is either in the subject, or out of it. If this possibility did not consist in the subject it would be in itself a substance that cannot be. Hence, it is necessary to admit preexistence of the subject carrying in possibility of occurrence of the world by such carrier of possibility of occurrence of the world the matter is. „Everything, that starts to be, wrote IbnSina, has a material principle... Everything, that starts to be after it was not, has, undoubtedly, a matter as all generated should be necessarily before the generation possible in itself“ 4). Means, the matter as a possibility substratum is the assumption of any validity. But as possibility is eternal, also the matter should be eternal. From the told follows, that the world is eternal. For, first, the matter never can be valid as simple possibility as it contradicts concept of a matter. It can be valid only in the valid things in which basis lays as possibility. Second, the reason and action are correlative, and cannot exist one without another. And the God and the world, according to IbnSina, correspond as the reason and action, therefore the world without the God, the God without the world are inconceivable. Means, if the God is eternal, also the world should be eternal. The world consists of the separate, individual elements making a subject of special sciences.

„Arguments of IbnSina in advantage, about the world can be summarised as follows. The creator, the demiurge always stays in an actual condition, or he is sometimes actual, sometimes; if he is always in an actual condition his creation should possess eternal actual life too; if at creation it passes from a potential condition in actual in it, there should be something such that at it was not before, - the purpose, desire, the nature, ability or something another in this sort, but in that case we should search for this change for the corresponding reason, for occurrence of this reason - other reason and so indefinitely. Further, if the world has arisen at will of the demiurge this will should choose any certain moment for creation, meanwhile as any moment of time is absolutely similar to all other moments and in them there is no such a thing, that would allow to give to one of them preference before the others. At last, the thing before to arise, should exist before in a potentiality, and potential life assumes matter preexistence, and it means, that the matter is immemorial, its creation in time is impossible, as any other matter, for it - one more matter and so on indefi nitely“4) for this purpose was required.

The occurrence of the world IbnSina explains by means of the theory of an emanation (expiration). Under his doctrine, the necessary life is essence conceiving, and consequently, and learning. Necessary life learns itself. Is the knowledge of this the first life caused by the reason? At the same time, the fi rst life caused by the reason, also is essence conceiving, or reason. The reason generated by the first life learns, on the one hand, the God, and, on the other hand - itself, both concerning the urgency, and concerning potentiality. As the reason, which Godwill know, considered IbnSina, there is a consequence to this knowledge with the second conceiving essence, or the second reason. As the first reason learns himself in the urgency, from there is a world soul corresponding to the second reason and as it learns herself and in the potentiality a consequence of this knowledge. The world sphere corresponding to world soul, or life. Thus there are generations of the second reason owing the knowledge of the first reason, the second reason generates the third reason. Learning himself in the urgency, he generates soul of the second heavenly sphere, and learning himself in the potentiality, he generates a body of this second heavenly sphere.

All this process of generations comes to the end with generation of our reason which radiates separate cogitative forms. The last generate our perceived feelings of substance and subjects which people concern also. On philosophical system of IbnSina, the necessity generates idea, reason.

Remarkably for the thinker, the doctrine about eternity of a matter is a matter of spirit as well as the doctrine about eternity of a matter as spirit in the outer side. This doctrine corresponds to the doctrine about its indestructibility. The indestructibility of a matter is proved on the basis of its communication with the concrete form of life. Under the doctrine of IbnSina, if the concrete form of life itself, on the basis of the spiritual essence, caused matter existence the matter with disappearance of the certain form, a certain material condition would be destroyed with occurrence something new every time again should arise and a matter, that is the continuous certificate of creation should be assumed. Therefore, adds IbnSina, the matter is not destroyed as a result of the termination of existence of the concrete form of life, as this form of life only comes off a matter to concede place to other concrete form of life. Materiality, specified IbnSina in „The knowledge Book“, happens earlier than life of the thing. Hence, all concrete, that began to exist after did not exist in time, has a matter in which its occurrence is put in pawn.

The philosophy of IbnSina and especially his doctrine about essence and existence have made huge impact on the subsequent philosophical theories of the East. Subsequently, in XVII century, Spinosa who has identified the God with the nature, has repeated IbnSina`s doctrine that in the nature of its essence coincides with existence. In this doctrine were concealed incompatible with religious. In this doctrine IbnSina took away from the God the role of the direct creator of separate things and the master of their destinies. Having separated the God from the world of terrestrial things a number of intermediate spheres or radiation steps, it did the doctrine possible to study the world of things not as direct creation of the God but how it exists in itself.

There upon IbnSina consider spertinently to mention those abilities of knowledge which are inherent to God. The Sheikh-ur-rais considers, that the God, being general, cannot know the individual, his destiny in general. In this respect the person, being similarity of the God, his concrete display, knows both general, and individual, naturally all. These reasons in a certain measure contradict afsir and wisdom kalam. Because of these judgments IbnSina also was exposed to prosecutions from religious conformists. IbnSina goes deep into Aristotle’s doctrine, originally treated occurrence of material things. In his understanding occurrence of things is not simple connection or a combination of invariable elements, and the valid transformation, their transformation. The basis of these transformations is material unity of elements as different kinds, according to IbnSina, in itself it is not limited. Divisibility of material bodies is infinite. He considered actual limitation of bodies as result of their divisibility. Therefore, opposing Demokrit`s atomic theories, the thinker denied existence of atoms as limit of divisibility of the matter. IbnSina, of course, in this case struggled for deeper understanding matter structures. He, with special force underlined, that in the atomic concept of emptiness the theory is unacceptable. „Continuous space, - he confirmed, - does not exist out of the matter. Emptiness which would be distance, does not exist... We hold that opinion, that the quantity is infinite; but this infinity exists such as the existence in possibility: not as the possibility passing in the validity and as the possibility designating, that the quantity can be increased indefinitely“5). In other passage he writes: „As to emptiness, it, in their opinion (i.e. according to followers of Demokrit actually, if the emptiness exists between, kept away from each other sensually, perceived and perceiving would not exist together, one would not operate on another and would not test its action“. Having studied and having analysed IbnSina, we can draw a conclusion, that the thinker did not write and did not mean any self-real, similar to Platon`s idea; there is only an idea, in one case forming real and individual essence of a subject, in other - the intellectual form which is representing itself as a matter of our „representation“ (tasabbur). Distinguishing the idea from the individual form, and from intellectual representation about it, IbnSina allocates with its and special, „own“ life, depending on our point of view, installation (itibar) and simultaneously possessing relative independence as the idea maintenance happens more richly. Our concept, which turns out, agrees with IbnSina, through definition, and it is not capable of all implication of corresponding idea. The development of this thought finds continuation in works of philosophers of Medieval Europe. But in more details we will consider this question further down. In the compositions – „the healing Book“, „the rescue Book“, „The knowledge Book“, „The reasons of occurrence of a lightning“, „Physics fragments“, „The canon of a medical science“ and others – IbnSina considers the origin of mountains, the rivers, minerals, the heavenly phenomena, earthquakes, inflow, health and illnesses etc. In the decision of these questions it step on the mystical-philosophical position and on number of concrete problems; advances the science of that time for many centuries forward. The assumption of IbnSina about the smallest organisms, which are the reason of infectious diseases is that, for example many other things discernments in medicine are similar also to geology, mineralogy. Rather essential value for understanding and an estimation of philosophy, IbnSina has his doctrine about causality. The causality problem was one of the central world outlook problems of all medieval philosophy. It was a field of fierce battle between seminary students and the philosophers, defending principles of the determinism. IbnSina, in the decision of problems of causalit, goes after Demokrit and considers, that all in the world is causally caused and that the causeless phenomena is not present. Certificates of this position are available in „The knowledge book“ and other compositions. Cause and effect relations, which IbnSina extended, and to relations of the God and to the world: the God, as it is necessary real has a world original cause. However, IbnSina has been convinced that the reason becomes valid only when it holds a consequence. Till this moment it either does not exist, or is not the reason. Hence, the God, as a world original cause, is necessary real only when it generates a consequence - the material world. From here follows, that the God after all, always exists. The world as his necessary consequence also exists always. As the subsequent development of philosophy shows, the doctrine of IbnSina about the movement was historically significant in the western historical-philosophical literature.

The analysis of IbnSina`s works – „Healing books“, „Books of instructions and manuals“, „Knowledge Books“, and others, proves that the Sheikh-ur-rais really follows the tradition of philosophy in treatment of a matter and the form, quantity and quality, and also movement, time and space. He perceives many problems and states in the spirit of comments al-Farabi to Aristotle’s „Metaphysics“ in which the exact and deep understanding of philosophy of „the fi rst teacher“ contains. However, IbnSina on many questions goes further Aristotle and al-Farabi, bringing the new moments to treatment of movement, time and space. It defines movement as „transition of a thing during certain time from a potential condition in valid“. From here follows, that potentially movement exists always, it is eternal. Any certificate of creation of movement was not, as it is primary.

IbnSina`s classification of kinds of movement is rather original and distinct from Aristotel`s. It enters two principles of classification of kinds of movement: on categories of possible-real life (i.e. оn quality, quantity, a place and time) and on sources (movement happens natural, accidental and compulsory). For IbnSina, the wide sight of movement, as the process including qualitative change, difficult development, phenomenon complication, growth, maturing and destruction, is characteristic.

Pondering over the movement of nature, the thinker approached to open the discrepancy of movement. „The body, - writes IbnSina, - in the same place is in rest, in movement“5). The space problem is comprehended by IbnSinain the form of a „place“ category. IbnSina starts with belief, that movement without a place and a place without movement does not exist. The place only coincides with a thing which takes a place. But the identity between them is not present. As things have three measurements, the same with the place. But this communication of a place and a thing is special: if the thing leaves a place other thing can occupy it. Therefore the place is not neither a substance, nor a body, a form. After all, if it was a substance it would be either corporal, or reasonable. And if the place was corporal it would take the place. But it is impossible. If the place was abstract essence it would be impossible to specify in its position and the sizes for abstract have no essence positions. But if the place was a body it would be simple or difficult and would consist the matter and the form. After all these reflections, IbnSina comes to conclusion that the place is accidental material substance and without communication with this substance it does not exist. With this conclusion IbnSina overcomes Aristotle’s fluctuations which have been inclined to recognize a place for a special kind of the reality, existing along with a matter, but separately from it. Equally for the epoch, the treatment of time was innovative also. He considered time primary and infinite, insisted of the necessity of a recognition of objectivity of time, struggled with its subjective understanding. Time, according to IbnSina, is also aksidation and is the form of life of any body; it „is connected with each kind Movements“, it acts also in the form of quantity of movement of bodies. IbnSina sharply opposed his subjective-psychological understanding of time. He wrote: „Time... For a body exists thanks to the movement. Therefore, if there is no movement and change, there is no time as well“. Therefore time does not exist as a special reality (as well as a place at Aristotle); it is not necessary to connect its life with the presence also reasonable soul (as it was done by Aristotle). Processing an antiquity heritage, IbnSina underlined objective character of the matter. He wrote: „Some basically reject existence of Time. Others, recognizing its life, do not recognize behind it objective existence outside and think, that it an essence imagined abstract concept“5). IbnSina rejects these opinions and insists on materiality and objectivity of time, its accidental character in relation with the matter. These sights of life forms of the matter were innovative and undoubtedly progressive for XI century. Its philosophical anthropology is deeply developed by IbnSina. It also contains many scientific guesses. This science in the Middle Ages aligned the attention round the main problem – the parity of soul and body. This parity IbnSina considers in four major aspects: as a problem of occurrence of life and evolution of its forms; as a problem of a parity of the spiritual and material beginning in the person; as a problem of moral perfection of the person and as a problem of the person`s knowledge about the external and private world. Proceeding from Aristotle’s heritage, IbnSina considers the soul as the beginning, the body, provides to it ability to grow, reproduction, to food mastering, to strong-willed movement and reasonable (not to an animal) to the knowledge. IbnSina divides all real into the organic nature (plants, animals and the person) and the inorganic nature (minerals). He is convinced that the inorganic nature presedes in time of the organic. Thus, it develops the thoughts planned still by Aristotle, on an origin of a life from a lifeless matter and reduces the definitive Abacus with the antique concept of gilozоizm, according to which all in the world lives, only degree of vitality and spirituality in the world phenomena is various. The concept of gilozizm removes the statement of the question on life origin. For this reason it dominated in antiquity and has remained in culture of philosophy and divinity in the Middle Ages. Aristotle has undermined bases of this concept, and IbnSina has finished the work the „teacher“ had started.

IbnSina distinguishes in the nature three kinds of soul: vegetative, animal and human (speaking). This classification meets at Aristotle. After the „teacher“, IbnSina proves a genetic relation of various kinds of soul: the higher kinds of soul arise on the basis of the lowest. Explaining essence of this genetic relation of soul, IbnSina approaches to the thought on evolution of kinds of soul, i.e. about the evolution of forms of a life, from the lowest level to the higher. This thought, in essence, was not yet Aristotle`s. According to him, the medieval pupil and the continuer, whom was IbnSina, have got absolutely special sounding, an anticreative orientation of the doctrine. Aristotle confused nobody; besides and for the gods were much easier in those days: if they created something, used thus clay or any other improvised material. In days of IbnSina, it became dangerous, as contradicted strict installations of the Koran. Its defender was threatened with charge in heresy. In treatment of vegetative and animal soul IbnSina repeats that Aristotle told in his composition „About a soul“ literally - the reason abletreatment, human or speaking souls also in traditions of the philosophies, but it is little more original. So, IbnSina writes: „Each person knows, that I am I... and all these bodies are submitted to me. I am sure, that these are tools of mime, and I use them for performance of various functions. If there was no need I would not require these bodies. I am I, and I am not these bodies... And for the purpose of that I learnt myself, that I am I, consists that when I repeat that I feel, I think also I work, – I carry all these qualities to that thing which I named“6). If we have to express in terms of philosophy of the new time that problematics over which IbnSina had fought, we will see, that it is a question about certain influence on formation of views IbnSina have rendered (magicians, prophets). At first this word named experts and commentators „Awesta“, and then all those who was not the Moslem.

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6. Ибн Сина. Жан туралы // Əл-Фараби мен Ибн Сина философиясы. / Құраст.: Т. Ғабитов, Ғ. Құрманғалиева. – Алматы: Жазушы, 2005. – 372–545 бб. на тази епоха, а неговото творчество въплъщава не само всички богатства на културата на хората от Централна Азия, но също така и традициите на древността.

The article was prepared with materials, given to the project No. 1503/GF2 „Tradition of tolerance in Islam“, with the executive collaboration and fi nancing of the Ministry of Education and sciences – RK.