

KANT'S AESTHETICS IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF SENSORY STUDIES

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Abstract. This article gives a synopsis of one of the fastest expanding in the last few decades interdisciplinary scientific fields keeping aesthetic problems and questions in its core, that of sensory studies, in order to sift out and systematize their interpretation of Kant's aesthetics from his *Critique of Pure Reason*, *Critique of Judgement* and *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. On that basis, six general conclusions are drawn on the interpretability and actuality of Kant's transcendental aesthetics, analytics of the beautiful and the sublime, division of the fine arts, and his later observation on the outer senses – through the lens of sensory studies.

Keywords: aesthetics; senses; sensory studies; modal anthropology; Kant; Howes

1. Introduction

This article was provoked by a persisting question on the place and actuality of the fundamentals of the canonical Western aesthetics, and, in particular, that of Kant's aesthetics, in the multiplicity of contemporary aesthetic theories, more and more interdisciplinary and rupturing the boundaries of any pure rationalism, empiricism or idealism. That is why the exposition will start from the very fundamentals of Kant's aesthetics contextualized for the aims of the article (section 2), in order to search for answers in one of the fastest expanding in the last few decades interdisciplinary scientific fields keeping aesthetic problems and questions in its core, that of sensory studies (section 4) – by defining its research scope in advance (section 3), and drawing some conclusions on overall base (section 5).

2. Fundamentals of Kant's Aesthetics

Kant's aesthetics is mostly unfolded on the pages of his *Critique of Pure Reason* (Kant 1998/1781), *Critique of Judgement* (Kant 2007/1790), and *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (Kant 2006/1798).

From the positions of his transcendentalism, Kant stands for a rather rationalist, or intellectualist view that assumes the existence of data from sensory experience

and searches for the very principles of their organization. Those principles that organize experience and cognition the German philosopher finds in the “*a priori* forms of sensibility” and the “categories of understanding”. His concept of the *a priori* forms, or basic elements of sensibility, is exposed in the section of Transcendental Aesthetics in his first *Critique* (Kant 1998/1781, pp. 153 – 192). In it, he discerns the receptive faculty of sensibility from our mere affects by objects and sensation; space and time are, on their part, that pure forms of all intuition as the result of this faculty of sensibility. This is the way that space and time are transcendently ideal, but at the same time empirically real since sensibility actualizes through them its experience with an object in intuition. Here also intuitions of time and space are distinguished, respectively, as intuitions of the inner sense and intuitions of the outer sense. Under this *a priori* stability, intuitions strictly differ from sensation which are not representations of objects, or their properties, or events, but are mere subjective and fleeting states.

Another significant concept from the first *Critique* is that of the faculty of judgement and the schema of cognition, in which the understanding subordinates a private intuition under a general category; in the third *Critique* (Kant 2007/1790), in the Section of Analytic of the Beautiful, Kant proposes the inverted form of this schema in the play of the imagination and the understanding, where a private, subjective intuition subordinates a general category of the understanding *as if* it comprises it: this act gives validity to the subjective universal communicability of the mode of representation in a judgement of taste, i.e. of the beautiful (cf. Kant 2007/1790, pp. 7 – 74). Yet, Part I. Critique of Aesthetic Judgement also contains statements from the transcendental aesthetics and its basic elements, albeit more distinct and explicit in the Analytic of the Sublime (cf. Kant 2007/1790, pp. 75 – 120).

More precisely, the judgement of taste is characterized by four moments: (1) quality, (2) quantity, (3) relation and (4) modality. In the case of the beautiful, (1) taste is the faculty of judging an object or a mode of pleasure *without any interest*, and the object of such pleasure is called beautiful; (2) taste is characterized by a subjective universality, and the beautiful is what is universally liked *without concept*; (3) the beautiful is a purposiveness without (external) purpose: a *subjective formal purposiveness*; (4) the beautiful is an object of *necessary pleasure* without concept. In the case of the sublime, however, there is an additional and more complex condition that it is no more a play of the imagination and the understanding but, for the sake of becoming pleasure and not fade away at the state of the horror, the reason takes the judgement’s function of converging with the imagination. That is why the four moment in the sublime take the following form: (1) the sublime is *acquired pleasure without interest* (acquired selflessness) – pleasure arises only on the basis of displeasure, of shock; (2) the judgment of the sublime is *universal* and necessary (expanded faculty of imagination, absolute magnitude) – this is the moment of the mathematically sublime; (3) the sublime is our supersensible nature – a

subjective purposiveness (relative to purposes) – this is the moment of the dynamically sublime (the sublime of might); (4) the sublime is a moral sense, a subjective universality, a *necessary* purposiveness requiring a higher culture than the one for perceiving the beautiful. It is the moment of the mathematically sublime that the *a priori* forms of sensibility, space and time, remain *as if* stripped by any fleeting sensations and feelings, and furthermore, even by any adequate intuition before an immeasurable *quantum*. And this explanation only can serve as an entrance to the apprehension of the intensity, or *magnum* in the dynamically sublime where the *a priori* forms of sensibility turn back and gather deeply in the very idea of ourselves and our ultimate purpose.

The analytics of the beautiful and the sublime are followed by the deduction of pure aesthetic judgments and a remark on art; here of interest for this article is, before all, the division of the fine arts (Kant 2007/1790, § 51, pp. 149 – 154) that left lasting traces in the subsequent Western art theory and history.

And, last but not least, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (Kant 2006/1798) contains various valuable observations on the so-called by Kant in his critical period “outer senses”: part of these observations will be put into consideration and comparative analysis in the perspective the 21st-century interdisciplinary field of sensory studies.

3. The Expanding Field of Sensory Studies

In their article *Introducing Sensory Studies*, Michael Bull, Paul Gilroy, David Howes and Douglas Kahn argue the so called “sensual revolution” in the humanities, social sciences and the arts, which “has disclosed the startling multiplicity of different *formations* of the senses in history and across (as well within) cultures” (Bull et al. 2006, p. 5) and, therefore, consider the perceptual not only as a matter of cognitive processes or neurological mechanisms in the individual as psychology or neurobiology do, but as a cultural and political construct as well. That is why the natural effect of the sensual revolution lays in the paradigmatic shift of the perceptual and sensation posing them as a mediator between self and environment, self and society, body and mind, idea and object.

Hence, in the middle 2000s sensory studies are set up as an integral part of the interdisciplinary field of cultural studies, yet not losing their scope on the individual in searching for new paths of explaining human nature and its polyphonic dynamics within society and culture¹. The foundational disciplines of this field are history and anthropology (Howes 2013); yet, another dozen disciplines have been involved in its elaborating over the past few decades, as aesthetics, archaeology, architecture, communication and media studies, geography, literary and cultural studies, philosophy, phenomenology, sociology², neuroscience, neurobiology, and the like (Bull et al. 2006, p. 6; Pink, Howes 2010; Ingold, Howes 2011; Lende, Downey 2012). Moreover, by defending the field of sensory studies the scholars pledge

for the need of overcoming “the logocentrism and ocularcentrism of conventional historical and social scientific accounts of ‘meaning’” (Bull et al. 2006, p. 5), and parallelize his increasing need to another, that of “a modal and intermodal or *relational* approach to the study of our corporeal faculties” (Bull et al. 2006, p. 6) since the homogenized notion of the body entails more and more problematic in its quality of pure abstraction after the presumption of the unity of the subject. Thus “the time for theorizing the senses is now” (Bull et al. 2006, p. 6): thinking *through* the senses has naturally become the next step in the realization and resistance of human nature.

Respectively, the perspective of sensory studies imposes a qualitatively new reading of the aesthetic – not as a form of judgement (whether Baumgarten’s perfection in perception, or Kant’s perception of perfection in his *Analytic of the Beautiful*), but “as the *disposition to sense acutely*” (Bull et al. 2006, p. 6). It is quite evident that from the end of the 19th century to today, along with the crisis of the human personality in its individual integrity, the leading humanitarian explanations of the *Zeitgeist* in Western culture proceed no longer from integrity, totality and perfection – from the ultimate purpose, but from the beginning, whether it is a life “urge” (*pulsion*) according to Bergson, a “drive” (*Trieb*) according to Freud, or the play drive (*Spieltrieb*) already conceptualized by Schiller, uniting the divergent form drive and sense drive. In this context, it is not surprising that nor aesthetics nor arts strive for perfection anymore: their current pledge is rather to grasp the very processes and dynamics of sensation, senses, emotions and feelings, deliberately thus leaving the human nature complex, rich, kaleidoscopic and never complete.

In particular, “sensory studies stand for a cultural approach to the study of the senses and a sensory approach to the study of culture”: “the senses are treated as both object of study and means of inquiry” (Howes 2013). This sensory turn started first in the fields of history and anthropology of the senses in the 1980s and 1990s, anteceded by Lévi-Strauss’ concept of a “science of the concrete”, i.e. of the “tangible qualities” (Lévi-Strauss 1962) typical of the classificatory systems of traditional societies as opposed to the abstractions of modern physics (Howes 2013), and that of “sensory codes” and imagery as a key to decipher a given culture (cf. Lévi-Strauss 1964; Howes 2003, pp. 3 – 58), and from Huizinga’s notion of the “historical sensation” in *The Autumn of the Middle Ages* (Huizinga 1996/1919). The long list of researches in sensory anthropology in the 1980s includes special interest in: sound and sentiment (Feld 1990/1982); varying ways of sight in different cultures (Howes 1991a; Goodwin 1994; Eck 1998; Grasseni 2007); a critique of the “verbo-centrism” and “textualism” in anthropological theory and ethnography so far at the expense of exploring sensory experience, rituals, traditions and culture (Grimshaw 2001; Clifford, Marcus 1986); embodiment as the basic key for anthropological research (Csordas 1990, 1994); “sensuous mimesis” (Taussig 1993); “sensory models” (Classen 1990, 1993). It is worth to note that the first two decades of the

sensory turn share common traits in criticizing Western culture and thought “visualism”, and searching for alternative non-visual modes of experience, including non-Western keys to better and more fully understand the sensorium; various devices like tape recorders and camcorders helped for this turn (cf. Howes 2013). On his part, Corbin, in his essay *Histoire et anthropologie sensorielle* (Corbin 2005/1990) further developed and specified sensory studies methodology in terms of habitus, norms and all that is written, or, better to say, being sensed, between the lines.

Not only flourished a multiplicity of anthropological research of cultural practices and history of such sensory objects like spices, sugar and salt, colors, perfume, etc., but also of such “ephemera” (Howes 2013) like darkness and light, noise and silence, etc., as well as visceral sensory responses like disgust, ASMR (autonomous sensory meridian response), intersensoriality, multisensoriality, and further differentiated sensory lines and niches like the ever-evolving and complementary classification and taxonomy of the senses (more than 36-7 according to interdisciplinary studies of natural and humanitarian studies so far). The sensory turn in geography was launched along with focusing on spatial organization (Pocock 1993; Law 2005). In the context of this article, among the academic fields under further elaboration in the recent decade are: archeology of the senses, philosophy of the senses, and sensory aesthetics.

4. Sensory Studies Interpreting Kant's Aesthetics

One of the founding scholars of the field of sensory studies, David Howes – professor of anthropology and co-director of the Centre of Sensory Studies at Concordia University (Montreal, Canada), recently published, among a few other thematic books, the monograph *The Sensory Studies Manifesto: Tracking the Sensorial Revolution in the Arts and Human Sciences*. In it, he accentuates precisely on the vigorous trend of the last decades that the revolutionary realization of the social and cultural development of senses has been put into specialized research in the human sciences, and practice – in the arts, presenting the human sensorium “as a dynamic heterarchy of approaches and expressions” and foregrounding the agency, interactivity, creativity, and “wisdom about the senses” as shaped by culture (Howes 2022, pp. 19, 12).

How does this state-of-the-arts of today's aesthetics perceive and interpret the fundamentals of Kantian aesthetics considered canon in Western aesthetics? It is not by chance that Howes argues with Kant's views precisely in Part Three. Multisensory Aesthetics:

“Baumgarten's worst fears concerning the rationalization of aesthetic perception were realized in Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Judgment* (1790). Kant attempted to transcend the dualism of vision and hearing and replace it with a fundamental division between “the arts of space” (e.g., painting) and “the arts of time” (e.g., music), accessible to “outer intuition” and “inner intuition,” respectively

(Rée 2000, pp. 58 – 60). It could be said that Kant rarefied aesthetics by divorcing it from perception and substituting intuition. After Kant, aesthetic judgment would be properly neutral, passionless, and disinterested (see Turner 1994; Eagleton 1990). This definition of aesthetics may have resulted in a drastic curtailment of human sensuousness (see Vercelloni 2016), but at least it guaranteed the autonomy of the enclave now known as “art” (Howes 2022, pp. 144 – 145).³

And Howes continues his argument on the fall of canonical Kantian aesthetics:

“In “Sensory Separation and the Founding of Art History,” the lead chapter of her *Art, Museums and Touch* (2010), Fiona Candlin explores the fallout of the Kantian revolution. She presents a sensory analysis of the works of Alois Riegel, Heinrich Wölfflin, and Erwin Panofsky, who are commonly regarded, in retrospect, as the founders of the discipline of art history. All three posit trajectories of increasing “perceptual sophistication” as unfolding since antiquity (Riegel takes Egyptian art as his starting point), in which tactile perception is the precursor to optical perception and the progression of artistic styles culminates in the modern use of linear perspective and naturalistic representation. On this account, “accomplished art,” which is to say European art (according to the prevailing conceit), depends on the banishment of the physical sense of touch and the achievement of a disembodied, abstracted system of visual representation. Even in the doctrine of “tactile values” elaborated by Bernard Berenson, it is the illusion of touch (i.e., the way a painting appeals to the “tactile imagination”), not the materiality of touch, that is extolled. Candlin goes on to show how the “sensory demarcation” of art history persists in visual culture studies, despite certain protestations to the contrary (e.g., Mitchell 1994). The history of art proper thus depends on the separation of vision from touch and the delegitimation of any sort of haptic engagement with art objects” (Howes 2022, p. 145).⁴

According to Candlin and other scholars like Constance Classen and Jonathan Rée, numerous actual practices lead to belying this theoretical, or speculative, marginalization of touch, like the tactile intimacy between art object and connoisseur, or such aesthetics of touch, in turn marginalizing vision (Candlin 2010, pp. 9 – 27; cf. Howes 2022, p. 211). This modernist exaltation of vision over touch is aptly explicated by Classen in *The Museum of the Senses* through the firm divide of fine arts from decorative and craft arts, unknown till the modern era (Classen 2017, p. 41). In her argumentation, with their systematizing and rarifying aesthetics, and making contemplation exceptionally “visual” in honor of the beautiful as a spiritual value, Kant and Hegel actually marginalized and underrated the so complex sense of touch; yet, nevertheless, with his canonical classification of the arts after time and space, inner and outer intuition, respectively – word, or articulation (rhetoric,

poetry), and gesture (painting, plastic arts – sculpture, architecture), together with tone/modulation (music, art of colors), Kant (Kant 2007/1790, § 51, pp. 149 – 154) anticipated the field of art theory and history, subsequently elaborated by Riegel, Wölfflin and Panofsky.

Howes has also written the prefaces for a dozen of monographs within the Routledge Sensory Studies Book Series (2016), of which he is a general editor. Of them, François Laplantine's *The Life of the Senses: Introduction to a Modal Anthropology* (original title *Le social et le sensible: introduction à une anthropologie modale*, 2005), explicably, contains the largest number of explicit references to Kant's aesthetics. Laplantine takes as the starting point of his modal anthropology the categorical thought, exemplified by many thinkers from Plato to Descartes, and from Kant to Durkheim, opposed to another tradition, comprised of the pre-Socrates, Spinoza, Rousseau, etc., who focus on duration, modulation and rhythm instead of essence and integrity (Laplantine 2015). The author places his concept of "sensible thinking" (*la pensée sensible*), or "modal thinking" in the second string, continuous with the world we step on (that "fluidity of life" after Simmel 2009) and capable of grasping even the slightest details of the sensible; that is why he pledges for the priority of synthetic arts like cinema, created on time-space base; while at the same time he considers the dichotomy of the sensible and the intelligible, the static and the dynamic, what can be known and what can be believed a pure scholar's detachment (Laplantine 2015, pp. 21, 24, 28). A closer and more relational anthropological approach Laplantine finds in Roger Bastide's conceptualization of categories that are both logical and affective (Bastide 1995, p. 223)⁵, or "more exactly schema in the Kantian sense, but schema of social life caught in processes of encounter and transformation, capable of accounting for a thought process of "participations, analogies, and correspondences" (Laplantine 2015, p. 73; Bastide 1995, p. 223).

In *Sensing the World: An Anthropology of the Senses* (original title *Anthropologie du corps et modernité*, 1990), David le Breton accentuated in the senses of sight, smell and taste in Kant's aesthetics: according to Kant, "the sense of sight, even if it is not more indispensable than that of hearing, is still the noblest, because among the senses, it is furthest removed from the sense of touch, the most limited condition of perception" (Breton 2017, p. 28; Kant 2006/1798: 48). – For reference, in his *Aesthetics*, Hegel also "rejects touch, odor, and taste as unfit for art, which, in its affinities with spirituality and contemplation, is removed from the more animal senses and appeals, rather, to sight and hearing" (Breton 2017, p. 28); Aristotle regarded smell "as a crude sense, inferior to that of animals and of little benefit to humankind" as well; for Condillac, though he made the smell the first sense of his fantastic sensuous statue, it was "because of all the senses it is the one that seems to contribute the least to the knowledge of the human mind" (Breton 2017, p. 131; Condillac 2014, pp. 170, 171). According to Kant smell rests as an "animal" sense,

of least value and interest, because ‘[I]t does not pay to cultivate it or refine it at all in order to enjoy; for there are more disgusting objects than pleasant ones [...] and even when we come across something fragrant, the pleasure coming from the sense of smell is always fleeting and transient’ (Kant 2006/1798, pp. 50, 51). Furthermore, Breton pledges,

“[O]dor is not enclosed in things like taste, or on their surface like color [...] Detached from its source like a sound, floating in space, it penetrates individuals who cannot prevent its intrusion. [...] While we can close our eyes to ignore a disturbing scene, stop eating or drinking to avoid an unpleasant flavor, or refrain from touching a decomposing substance, we cannot escape odors, even when they make life unpleasant. “Contrary to liberty,” as Kant would say, odor invades those who smell it. It determines the emotional ambiance of a place or encounter because it is a state that is ethereal but whose effects are powerful. Mingled with our imaginations, it is never so much the odor that is smelled as it is the meaning invested in it.” (Breton 2017, pp. 135 – 136).

Besides sight and smell, Breton also discussed from its lowest notes to its highest in Kant: “The mouth tastes flavors at the same time that the nose inhales them in an inseparable process. Food’s aromas are perceived retronasally. Olfaction always accompanies taste. It is the “preliminary taste,” according to Kant” (Breton 2017, p. 179; cf. Tuan 1995, p. 55). At this point, it is also very relevant to mention another research on sensory studies, Classen’s *The Color of Angels: Cosmology, Gender and the Aesthetic Imagination*:

“The decline of belief in the odor of sanctity was due not only to the Enlightenment de-mythologizing of the world, but to a decline in the importance of smell in general. The philosophers of the Enlightenment had concluded that smell was an insignificant, “animal” sense, incapable of serving as a medium for the intellect or the spirit. [...] Kant dismissed smell as the most dispensable of the senses, one which did not even merit aesthetic cultivation” (Classen 1998, p. 58).

In just the same manner Horkheimer and Adorno wrote in their *Dialectic of Enlightenment* that when we see we remain what we are, but when we smell we are taken over by otherness, and thus the sense of smell is considered as disgrace in civilization, and as the sign of lower social strata. Synnott even goes further in *The Body Social: Symbolism, Self and Society* by insisting that:

“This tradition of the disparagement of the sense of smell is most ancient. Aristotle developed a clear hierarchy of the sensorium. At the top were the human senses of sight and hearing, whose special contributions to humanity were beauty

and music, and both could lead to God; at the bottom were the animal senses of taste and touch, which alone could be abused, by gluttony and lust respectively, and which did not lead to God. In between was smell: it could not be abused, in Aristotle's view, but then, nor could it lead to God; none the less, he classified it as a human sense, but the lowest one. Aquinas followed Aristotle closely. Kant did not even discuss the sense of smell in his aesthetics. Basically, there is no aesthetics of smell in the Western tradition. Textbooks on aesthetics usually discuss visual beauty and the aural beauty of music, and perhaps taste, and perhaps the tactile textures of skin, marble or fabric. But not smell" (Synnott 2002, p. 185).

As for taste in Kant, in *Sensory Arts and Design* Ian Heywood follows Kant in what the latter puts as the "higher" notion of taste:

"[e]veryone must allow that a judgment on the beautiful which is tinged with the slightest interest, is very partial and not a pure judgment of taste. One must not be in the least prepossessed in favor of the existence of the thing, but must preserve complete indifference in this respect, in order to play the part of judge in matters of taste" (Kant 2007/1790, p. 38).

This is what Kant means under reaching that immutable and persisting form of pure judgement of aesthetic taste (and beauty), no more related to any lower form like appetite and gustatory taste that cloud this pure judgement by personal interest immersed in subjective empiria (cf. Heywood , pp. 126 – 127).

5. Conclusions

As it could be seen from the overall synopsis of the field of sensory studies, there are several main points in which it intersects with the basic statements of Kant's aesthetics:

First of all, the 20th-century line in philosophical anthropology and aesthetics (both continental and analytical), as a rule criticizes the formalism of Kant's aesthetics. It is explicable for such a revolutionary century, in which the fields of philosophy of perception, philosophy of body, philosophy of sports and anthropology of the senses find their distinct elaboration, to search its objects of research beyond the static, ahistoricity and universality of forms, no matter that those forms are subjective or other constructs. That is why sensory studies as a whole prefer a more open and dynamic approach which Bull et al. (2006, p. 6) describe as a "modal and intermodal or *relational*". Nevertheless, Lamartine's approach to modal anthropology of the senses already revealed that a relational approach means neither staying predominantly on the level of empiria, since the very thinking of modality and intermodality needs formal logical constructs; so do Classen's "sensory models".

Secondly, on the one hand, Csordas' insisting on embodiment as the basic key for anthropological research *versus* highly abstract philosophical aesthetic system to comprise the abundance of senses can be counted part of the aforementioned criticism of Kant's formalism, but also of his rationalism and intellectualism. However, on the other hand, it is striking that we can find even in *The Oxford Handbook on Empirical Aesthetics* (2022), that arguments for the bold thesis that cognition should be understood as embodied use precisely section 1 of Kant's first *Critique* to explain the moment of experienced presence or aura – “there is a fleeting moment when an object is not yet thoroughly processed in the cognitive system: a stage of pure sensibility that may entail conscious representations and reflections” – which is at the center of the perception of an artwork (Tröndle et al. 2022, p. 371).

Thirdly, it can be said for Tossig's notion of “sensuous mimesis” that is actually a personalized form of that “subjective communicability”, although not universal. A further fruitful path would be to connect this presumption to the notion of *Einfühlung* and its English translation with the neologism of empathy, its genealogy and metamorphoses of meaning through the whole 20th century. Whether through a relational approach, Kant has managed to capture a very subtle moment in the sharability of aesthetic judgement.

Fourth, it was already mentioned that Kant's division of the fine arts triggered subsequent precisions in classifying their types and genres over the next century and a half.

Fifth, rarifying aesthetics through dethronating the sense of smell on the background of the ever increasing “perceptual sophistication” draws a remarkable conclusion for Howes at the same time:

“Kant also did something else: he gave us the category of the self. “It is only with Kant that it [i.e., the modern notion of the person as an individual conscience] took on precise form” (Mauss 1979: 89). This connection between the emergence of the notion of the person and the sudden lowering of the threshold of olfactory tolerance [...] Could it be that the reason we moderns are, on the whole, so intolerant of odours has to do with our preoccupation with what Hertz called ‘the continuous thread of the individual life,’ our denial of transition [...]?” (Howes 1991b, p. 145).⁶

Finally, in this sense, the transition lies precisely between the olfaction as the “preliminary taste”, already proved in neurobiology (physiological taste is subordinated to olfaction), and the complete disinterestedness of that higher culture of taste reached in the Kantian sublime: and all this field in-between is ours, not to forget, because of the reached so far.

NOTES

1. Cf. this idea already lying in Walter J. Ong's *The Shifting Sensorium*, one of the foundational works in the emerging field: "The sensorium is a fascinating focus for cultural studies" (Ong 1991, p. 28). First, in 2006 the Senses and Society journal was launched (<https://www.tandfonline.com/journals/rfss20>); after that, in 2010, the Sensory Studies website (<https://www.sensorystudies.org/>) went live as a second official platform for sensory studies.
2. Cf. the remarkable note of Georg Simmel's: "That we get involved in interactions at all depends on the fact that we have a sensory effect upon one another" (Simmel 1997, p. 110).
3. Internal citations by: Rée, J. 2000. The Aesthetic Theory of the Arts. In: Osborne, P. (ed.). *From an Aesthetic Point of View: Philosophy, Art and the Senses*. London: Serpent's Tail. ISBN 978-1852426683; Turner, B. S. 1994. Introduction. In: Buci-Glucksmann, C. *Baroque Reason: The Aesthetics of Modernity*. London: Sage. ISBN 978-0803989764; Eagleton, T. 1990. *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*. Oxford: Blackwell. ISBN 9780631163015.
4. Internal citation by: Mitchell, W. J. T. 1994. The Pictorial Turn. In: Mitchell, W. J. T. *Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0226532325.
5. Cf. Michel Dufrenne's notion of the philosophical-aesthetic categories like the beautiful, the sublime, the tragic, etc. like "affective categories" in the context of his concept of the *a priori*, simultaneously existential and the cosmological, grounding human experience in the world precisely through the affective *a priori*, on its turn actualizing itself through the *habitus*. Within it, "taste possesses the character of a confused and yet evident knowledge [*connaissance*] which anticipates and prepares the way for experience. Taste is a way of reacting with all one's being" (Dufrenne 1973, pp. 491, 450, 489).
6. Internal citation by: Mauss, M. 1979. A Category of the Human Mind: The Notion of Person, the Notion of Self. In: *Sociology and Psychology: Essays by Marcel Mauss*. Transl. by B. Brewster. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 57 – 94. ISBN 978-0710088772.

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